	{"id":2873,"date":"2012-03-11T11:47:00","date_gmt":"2012-03-11T11:47:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.pokerstrategy.com\/cs\/strategy\/nash-equilibrium-bluffing-calling-frekvence\/"},"modified":"2026-06-11T10:59:43","modified_gmt":"2026-06-11T10:59:43","slug":"nash-equilibrium-bluffing-calling-frekvence","status":"publish","type":"strategy","link":"https:\/\/www.pokerstrategy.com\/cs\/strategy\/bss\/nash-equilibrium-bluffing-calling-frekvence\/","title":{"rendered":"Nashovo ekvilibrium a blafovac\u00ed\/callovac\u00ed frekvence"},"content":{"rendered":"<?xml encoding=\"utf-8\" ?><h1>Nashovo ekvilibrium a blafovac&iacute;\/callovac&iacute; frekvence<\/h1><h1>&Uacute;vod<\/h1><p><b><i>V tomto &#269;l&aacute;nku<\/i><\/b> <\/p><ul class=\"emoList1\">\n<li><i>&Uacute;vod do teorie her<br> <\/i><\/li>\n<li><i>Nashovo ekvilibrium a jeho implikace<br> <\/i><\/li>\n<li><i>Frekvence s&aacute;zen&iacute; a dorovn&aacute;v&aacute;n&iacute;<\/i><\/li>\n<\/ul><div style=\"text-align: center;margin-bottom: 12px\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"\/\/www.pokerstrategy.com\/download\/content\/bilder\/ps_trennlinie.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"100%\" height=\"1\"><\/div><p class=\"MsoNormal\">Teorie her je odv&#283;tv&iacute; matematiky, kter&eacute; se zab&yacute;v&aacute; ur&#269;it&yacute;mi druhy konfliktn&iacute;ch situac&iacute; neboli hrami. V tomto kontextu se term&iacute;n \"hra\" pou&#382;&iacute;v&aacute; pro takov&eacute; situace, kdy n&#283;kolik subjekt&#367; soupe&#345;&iacute; o omezen&eacute; zdroje a ka&#382;d&yacute; z nich se p&#345;i tom &#345;&iacute;d&iacute; svoj&iacute; zvolenou strategi&iacute; (m&#367;&#382;e i s n&#283;k&yacute;m spolupracovat) a m&#367;&#382;e dos&aacute;hnout zisku. <\/p><p> &Uacute;st&#345;edn&iacute;m t&eacute;matem v teorii her je tzv. Nashovo ekvilibrium, kter&eacute; popisuje stav, p&#345;i n&#283;m&#382; mezi soupe&#345;&iacute;c&iacute;mi subjekty nast&aacute;v&aacute; strategick&aacute; rovnov&aacute;ha a v&scaron;echny subjekty v&#283;d&iacute;, jak&aacute; je nejlep&scaron;&iacute; reakce na ur&#269;itou akci soupe&#345;e. &#381;&aacute;dn&yacute; ze subjekt&#367; (hr&aacute;&#269;&#367;) nem&aacute; mo&#382;nost zv&yacute;&scaron;it sv&#367;j zisk t&iacute;m, &#382;e provede jednostrannou zm&#283;nu ve sv&eacute; strategii.<\/p><p> V na&scaron;em &#269;l&aacute;nku se sezn&aacute;m&iacute;te se z&aacute;klady teorie her, Nashov&yacute;mi ekvilibrii jako strategick&yacute;mi &#345;e&scaron;en&iacute;mi a na p&#345;&iacute;kladu frekvenc&iacute; s&aacute;zen&iacute; a dorovn&aacute;v&aacute;n&iacute; si uk&aacute;&#382;eme aplikaci Nashova ekvilibria v praxi. Abyste obsahu &#269;l&aacute;nku mohli pln&#283; porozum&#283;t, je nutn&eacute;, abyste m&#283;li alespo&#328; z&aacute;kladn&iacute; znalosti z teorie matic.<\/p><h1>Stru&#269;n&yacute; &uacute;vod do teorie her<\/h1><p>V matematice se hra skl&aacute;d&aacute; z t&#283;chto prvk&#367;:<\/p><ul>\n<li class=\"MsoNormal\">ur&#269;it&eacute;ho po&#269;tu hr&aacute;&#269;&#367;<\/li>\n<li class=\"MsoNormal\">souboru ur&#269;it&yacute;ch (&#269;ist&yacute;ch) strategi&iacute;, podle kter&yacute;ch mohou jednotliv&iacute; hr&aacute;&#269;i postupovat<\/li>\n<li class=\"MsoNormal\">funkce, kter&aacute; ka&#382;d&eacute; jednotliv&eacute; strategii (kterou si n&#283;kter&yacute; hr&aacute;&#269; vybere) p&#345;i&#345;azuje ur&#269;it&yacute; zisk. Ur&#269;uje tedy, jak&eacute;ho zisku tento hr&aacute;&#269; dos&aacute;hne, kdy&#382; se danou strategi&iacute; bude &#345;&iacute;dit<\/li>\n<\/ul><p> D&aacute;le se budeme v&#283;novat pouze situac&iacute;m, kdy se hry &uacute;&#269;astn&iacute; jenom dva hr&aacute;&#269;i. Takovou hru m&#367;&#382;eme snadno popsat s pomoc&iacute; dvou matic <i>A a B <\/i>o po&#269;tu <i>m <\/i>&#345;&aacute;dk&#367; x<i> n <\/i>sloupc&#367;. Hr&aacute;&#269; 1 m&aacute; potom m strategi&iacute; (<i>S1,...,Sm<\/i>) a hr&aacute;&#269; 2 m&aacute; n strategi&iacute; (<i>S'1,...,S'n<\/i>). Pokud si hr&aacute;&#269; 1 vybere strategii <i>Si<\/i> a hr&aacute;&#269; 2 zvol&iacute; <i>S'j, <\/i>pak bude v&yacute;plata pro hr&aacute;&#269;e 1 ve v&yacute;&scaron;i <i>Aij<\/i> a pro hr&aacute;&#269;e <i>2 <\/i>ve v&yacute;&scaron;i <i>Bij.<\/i><\/p><p> V&yacute;plata hr&aacute;&#269;e 1:<\/p><table border=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"7\" width=\"220\" align=\"center\">\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"border: 1px solid #8c9c9b;width: 24px\">\n<p><\/p><\/td>\n<td style=\"border: 1px solid #8c9c9b;width: 24px\"><b><i>S'1<\/i><\/b>\n<\/td>\n<td style=\"border: 1px solid #8c9c9b;width: 24px\"><b><i>S'2<\/i><\/b>\n<\/td>\n<td style=\"border: 1px solid #8c9c9b;width: 24px\">...\n<\/td>\n<td style=\"border: 1px solid #8c9c9b;width: 24px\"><b><i>S'n<\/i><\/b>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"border: 1px solid #8c9c9b;width: 24px\"><b><i>S1<\/i><\/b>\n<\/td>\n<td style=\"border: 1px solid #8c9c9b;width: 24px\"><i>A11<\/i>\n<\/td>\n<td style=\"border: 1px solid #8c9c9b;width: 24px\"><i>A12<\/i>\n<\/td>\n<td style=\"border: 1px solid #8c9c9b;width: 24px\">...\n<\/td>\n<td style=\"border: 1px solid #8c9c9b;width: 24px\"><i>A1n<\/i>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"border: 1px solid #8c9c9b;width: 24px\"><b><i>S2<\/i><\/b>\n<\/td>\n<td style=\"border: 1px solid #8c9c9b;width: 24px\"><i>A21<\/i>\n<\/td>\n<td style=\"border: 1px solid #8c9c9b;width: 24px\"><i>A22<\/i>\n<\/td>\n<td style=\"border: 1px solid #8c9c9b;width: 24px\">...\n<\/td>\n<td style=\"border: 1px solid #8c9c9b;width: 24px\"><i>A2n<\/i>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"border: 1px solid #8c9c9b;width: 24px\">...\n<\/td>\n<td style=\"border: 1px solid #8c9c9b;width: 24px\">...\n<\/td>\n<td style=\"border: 1px solid #8c9c9b;width: 24px\">...\n<\/td>\n<td style=\"border: 1px solid #8c9c9b;width: 24px\">...\n<\/td>\n<td style=\"border: 1px solid #8c9c9b;width: 24px\">...\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"border: 1px solid #8c9c9b;width: 24px\"><b><i>Sm<\/i><\/b>\n<\/td>\n<td style=\"border: 1px solid #8c9c9b;width: 24px\"><i>Am1<\/i>\n<\/td>\n<td style=\"border: 1px solid #8c9c9b;width: 24px\"><i>Am2<\/i>\n<\/td>\n<td style=\"border: 1px solid #8c9c9b;width: 24px\">...\n<\/td>\n<td style=\"border: 1px solid #8c9c9b;width: 24px\"><i>Amn<\/i>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table><p> <b><span style=\"background-color: #ff0000\"> <\/span><\/b><\/p><div align=\"left\"><b><span style=\"background-color: #ff0000\"><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">Pokud nap&#345;&iacute;klad plat&iacute;, &#382;e <\/span><\/span><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">A=B= I2<\/span><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff\"> (matice ve form&aacute;tu 2x2), potom oba hr&aacute;&#269;i obdr&#382;&iacute; v&yacute;platu <\/span><i style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">1<\/i><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">, jestli&#382;e si oba vyberou bu&#271; prvn&iacute;, nebo druhou strategii, a jinak obdr&#382;&iacute; v&yacute;platu ve v&yacute;&scaron;i 0. <\/span><\/b><\/div><p> Hr&aacute;&#269;i mohou tak&eacute; pou&#382;&iacute;vat sm&iacute;&scaron;enou strategii, to znamen&aacute;, &#382;e z n&#283;kolika &#269;ist&yacute;ch strategi&iacute; si vyb&iacute;raj&iacute; s ur&#269;itou pravd&#283;podobnost&iacute;. Sou&#269;et t&#283;chto pravd&#283;podobnost&iacute; je pochopiteln&#283; 1. Sm&iacute;&scaron;enou strategii lze popsat s pomoc&iacute; vektoru <i>p<\/i>, kde <i>pi<\/i> reprezentuje pravd&#283;podobnost, se kterou se hr&aacute;&#269; bude &#345;&iacute;dit strategi&iacute; &#269;&iacute;slo <i>i<\/i>.<\/p><p> Pokud hr&aacute;&#269; 1 pou&#382;&iacute;v&aacute; sm&iacute;&scaron;enou strategii p a hr&aacute;&#269; 2 sm&iacute;&scaron;enou strategii q, potom oba obdr&#382;&iacute; v&yacute;platu ve v&yacute;&scaron;i pAq, resp. pBq<i>. <\/i>(Pro &#269;ist&eacute; strategie je mo&#382;n&eacute; naj&iacute;t odpov&iacute;daj&iacute;c&iacute; v&yacute;sledek v p&#345;&iacute;slu&scaron;n&eacute; matici.)<\/p><p> Pro hr&aacute;&#269;e 1 si nazveme strategii p <u>\"nejlep&scaron;&iacute; reakc&iacute;\"<\/u> na strategii q hr&aacute;&#269;e 2, jestli&#382;e p p&#345;inese hr&aacute;&#269;i 1 nejvy&scaron;&scaron;&iacute; mo&#382;nou v&yacute;platu neboli jestli&#382;e plat&iacute; tato nerovnice:<\/p><p> <i>pAq &gt;= p'Aq<\/i> pro v&scaron;echny strategie p' hr&aacute;&#269;e 1.<\/p><p> Analogicky bude strategie <i>q<\/i> hr&aacute;&#269;e 2 nejlep&scaron;&iacute; reakc&iacute; na strategii <i>p<\/i> hr&aacute;&#269;e 1 tehdy, pokud plat&iacute; nerovnice:<\/p><p> <i> pBq &gt;= pBq'<\/i> pro v&scaron;echny strategie q' hr&aacute;&#269;e 2.<\/p><p> Dvojice strategi&iacute; <i>(p,q), <\/i>kde <i>p<\/i> je strategie hr&aacute;&#269;e 1 a<i> q<\/i> je strategie hr&aacute;&#269;e 2, se naz&yacute;v&aacute; \"<u>Nashovo ekvilibrium (NEQ)\"<\/u>, jestli&#382;e <i>p<\/i> je nejlep&scaron;&iacute; reakc&iacute; na <i>q<\/i> a <i>q<\/i> je nejlep&scaron;&iacute; reakc&iacute; na <i>p<\/i>.<\/p><p> Lze dok&aacute;zat, &#382;e v ka&#382;d&eacute; h&#345;e existuje minim&aacute;ln&#283; jedno NEQ (by&#357; nemus&iacute; nutn&#283; nastat p&#345;i &#269;ist&yacute;ch strategi&iacute;ch).<\/p><p> NEQ nemus&iacute; b&yacute;t Paretov&yacute;m optimem. (NEQ bude paretooptim&aacute;ln&iacute;, pokud nen&iacute; mo&#382;n&eacute; NEQ zm&#283;nit tak, aby jeden z hr&aacute;&#269;&#367; z&iacute;skal v&#283;t&scaron;&iacute; v&yacute;platu, ani&#382; by p&#345;itom druh&yacute; hr&aacute;&#269; obdr&#382;el v&yacute;platu ni&#382;&scaron;&iacute;.)<\/p><p> Naopak, paretooptim&aacute;ln&iacute; dvojice strategi&iacute; nemus&iacute; b&yacute;t je&scaron;t&#283; nutn&#283; NEQ. Dob&#345;e zn&aacute;m&yacute;m p&#345;&iacute;kladem takov&eacute; dvojice strategi&iacute; je tzv. <u><a href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Prisoners%27_Dilemma\">v&#283;z&#328;ovo dilema<\/a><\/u>, ale tomuto t&eacute;matu se zde nebudeme podrobn&#283; v&#283;novat. Zaj&iacute;mav&eacute; jsou i jin&eacute; koncepty ekvilibria; ani ty zde nebudeme rozeb&iacute;rat. Pat&#345;&iacute; k nim nap&#345;&iacute;klad <u><a href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Evolutionarily_stable_strategy\">evolu&#269;n&#283; stabiln&iacute; strategie<\/a><\/u> nebo korelovan&eacute; ekvilibrium.<\/p><p> Jestli&#382;e se oba dva hr&aacute;&#269;i &#345;&iacute;d&iacute; &#269;ist&yacute;mi strategiemi, potom je mo&#382;n&eacute; velmi jednoduchou metodou zjistit, jak&eacute; strategie povedou k NEQ - pou&#382;ije se zde v&yacute;&scaron;e uveden&yacute; p&#345;&iacute;klad <i>A=B=I2<\/i>. <\/p><p> Strategie <i>p<\/i> hr&aacute;&#269;e 1 bude <i>(a,1-a), <\/i>kde <i>a <\/i>je <i>[0,1]<\/i>, zat&iacute;mco strategie <em>q<\/em> hr&aacute;&#269;e 2 bude <i>(b,1-b)<\/i>, kde <i>b <\/i>je rovn&#283;&#382; <i>[0,1]<\/i>. Nyn&iacute; najdeme nejlep&scaron;&iacute; reakci hr&aacute;&#269;e 1 na strategii <i>(b,1-b) <\/i>hr&aacute;&#269;e 2: to provedeme porovn&aacute;n&iacute;m v&yacute;plat p&#345;i strategi&iacute;ch <i>(1,0)<\/i> a <i>(0,1) <\/i>(tj. v&yacute;platy p&#345;i &#269;ist&yacute;ch strategi&iacute;ch v ka&#382;d&eacute;m ze dvou &#345;&aacute;dk&#367;). <\/p><p> Pokud si hr&aacute;&#269; 1 vybere prvn&iacute; &#345;&aacute;dek matice, pak je jeho v&yacute;plata <i>b<\/i>, a pokud si zvol&iacute; &#345;&aacute;dek druh&yacute;, pak je jeho v&yacute;plata <i>1-b<\/i>. Pro <i>b &gt; 1-b, <\/i>co&#382; je ekvivalentn&iacute; s <i>b &gt; 0.5,<\/i> je nejlep&scaron;&iacute; reakce v prvn&iacute;m &#345;&aacute;dku, jin&yacute;mi slovy <i>a = 1<\/i>. Analogicky pro <i>b &lt; 0.5<\/i> je nejlep&scaron;&iacute; zvolit &#345;&aacute;dek 2, tedy <i>a = 0<\/i>. Pro <i>b = 0.5<\/i> hr&aacute;&#269; 1 obdr&#382;&iacute; v&yacute;platu <i>1\/2.<\/i> Proto je ka&#382;d&aacute; strategie i nejlep&scaron;&iacute; reakc&iacute;.<\/p><p> Tento postup zopakujeme pro hr&aacute;&#269;e 2. P&#345;&iacute;klad je zrcadlov&#283; obr&aacute;cen, a proto z&iacute;sk&aacute;me <i>b=1<\/i> pro <i>a &gt; 0.5<\/i>, <i>b = 0<\/i> pro <i>a &lt; 0.5<\/i> a libovoln&eacute; <i>b<\/i> <i>[0,1]<\/i> pro <i>a = 0.5<\/i>.<\/p><p> Nashova ekvilibria jsou definov&aacute;na jako dvojice strategi&iacute;, kde je ka&#382;d&aacute; z nich nejlep&scaron;&iacute; reakc&iacute; na tu druhou. Je jasn&eacute;, &#382;e NEQ(s) je mo&#382;n&eacute; vyj&aacute;d&#345;it i graficky jako pr&#367;se&#269;&iacute;k(y).<\/p><p> NEQs v na&scaron;&iacute; h&#345;e budou<i><strong>&nbsp;<\/strong> ((1,0),(1,0)), ((0,1),(0,1))<\/i> a <i>((0.5,0.5),(0.5,0.5))<\/i>.<\/p><h1><b>S&aacute;zkov&eacute;\/callovac&iacute; frekvence<\/b><\/h1><p>Pod&iacute;vejme se na n&aacute;sleduj&iacute;c&iacute; situaci: Hr&aacute;&#269; 1 (mimo pozici) a hr&aacute;&#269; 2 (v pozici) jsou na riveru a je dost jasn&eacute;, jak silnou handu dr&#382;&iacute; hr&aacute;&#269; 2. Hr&aacute;&#269; 1 v&iacute;, zda je lep&scaron;&iacute;, a hr&aacute;&#269; 2 v&iacute;, &#382;e to hr&aacute;&#269; 1 v&iacute;. <\/p><p> Pokud hr&aacute;&#269; 1 por&aacute;&#382;&iacute; handu hr&aacute;&#269;e 2, potom hr&aacute;&#269; 1 pochopiteln&#283; vsad&iacute; value bet (hr&aacute;&#269; 2 v&#382;dycky checkne behind, nebo&#357; hr&aacute;&#269; 1 v&iacute;, kdo je lep&scaron;&iacute;). Odpov&#283;&#271; na ot&aacute;zku, jak &#269;asto by hr&aacute;&#269; 1 m&#283;l blafovat, pochopiteln&#283; z&aacute;vis&iacute; na protihr&aacute;&#269;i. Nem&#283;l by nap&#345;&iacute;klad logicky blafovat proti calling station, ale m&#283;l by zkusit blaf proti slab&eacute;mu hr&aacute;&#269;i. Pro hr&aacute;&#269;e 2 rozhodnut&iacute;, zda po betu hr&aacute;&#269;e 1 dorovnat, nebo zahodit, rovn&#283;&#382; z&aacute;vis&iacute; na soupe&#345;ovi.<\/p><p> Tuto situaci m&#367;&#382;eme namodelovat n&aacute;sledovn&#283; ve form&#283; hry:<\/p><ul>\n<li>hr&aacute;&#269; 1 m&aacute; (&#269;ist&eacute;) \tstrategie <i>blafovat<\/i> a <i>zdr&#382;et se blafov&aacute;n&iacute;<\/i>. Sm&iacute;&scaron;en&aacute; strategie <i>(a,1-a)<\/i> by potom byla takov&aacute; strategie, kde hr&aacute;&#269; 1 bude p&#345;i sv&eacute;m s&aacute;zen&iacute; blafovat&nbsp; s pravd&#283;podobnost&iacute; <i>a<\/i> (ale nikoli strategie, kdy hr&aacute;&#269; 1 bude blafovat s pravd&#283;podobnost&iacute; <i>a<\/i>, pokud m&aacute; &scaron;patnou handu. V&iacute;ce o tom si &#345;ekneme ve t&#345;et&iacute; &#269;&aacute;sti.)<\/li>\n<\/ul><ul>\n<li>hr&aacute;&#269; 2 m&aacute; (&#269;ist&eacute;) \tstrategie <i>call<\/i> a <i>fold<\/i>. Sm&iacute;&scaron;en&aacute; strategie <i>(b,1-b)<\/i>&nbsp;by potom byla takov&aacute; strategie, kde hr&aacute;&#269; 2 dorovn&aacute; s pravd&#283;podobnost&iacute; <i>b<\/i>, jestli&#382;e hr&aacute;&#269; 1 vsad&iacute;.<\/li>\n<\/ul><p> Jak si nyn&iacute; uk&aacute;&#382;eme, je pom&#283;rn&#283; snadn&eacute; naj&iacute;t nejlep&scaron;&iacute; reakce na strategie soupe&#345;&#367; (p&#345;edpokl&aacute;dejme, &#382;e hr&aacute;&#269; 1 bude s&aacute;zet bety ve v&yacute;&scaron;i x*velikost potu):<\/p><p> Aby mohl hr&aacute;&#269; 2 profitabiln&#283; dorovnat, mus&iacute; b&yacute;t lep&scaron;&iacute; v <i>x*pot\/((1+2x)*pot) = x\/(1+2x)<\/i> p&#345;&iacute;pad&#367;. To znamen&aacute;, &#382;e nejlep&scaron;&iacute; reakc&iacute; hr&aacute;&#269;e 2 na strategii <i>(a,1-a)<\/i> je fold (tj. <i>(0,1)<\/i> neboli <i>b=0<\/i>)<i><b>, pokud a &lt; x\/(1+2x).<\/b><\/i><b><i style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">&nbsp;<\/i><\/b><\/p><p>Plat&iacute;-li <i>a&gt;x\/(1+2x), <\/i>pak nejlep&scaron;&iacute; reakc&iacute; hr&aacute;&#269;e 2 je call (<i>tj. (1,0)<\/i> neboli <i>b=1<\/i>). Pokud <i>plat&iacute; a=x\/(1+2x)<\/i>, potom je nejlep&scaron;&iacute; ka&#382;d&aacute; strategie <i>(b,1-b)<\/i>, kde <i>b<\/i> je <i>[0,1]<\/i>.<\/p><p> Aby hr&aacute;&#269; 1 mohl profitabiln&#283; blafovat, blaf mus&iacute; b&yacute;t &uacute;sp&#283;&scaron;n&yacute; v <i>x*pot\/((x+1)*pot) = x\/(x+1)<\/i> p&#345;&iacute;pad&#367;, tj. hr&aacute;&#269; 2 mus&iacute; zahodit p&#345;inejmen&scaron;&iacute;m v <i>x\/(x+1)<\/i> p&#345;&iacute;pad&#367;. <\/p><p> To znamen&aacute;, &#382;e nejlep&scaron;&iacute; reakc&iacute; hr&aacute;&#269;e 1 na <i>(b,1-b)<\/i> p&#345;i <i>b&gt;x\/(x+1)<\/i> je nikdy neblafovat (<i>tj. (0,1)<\/i> neboli <i>a=0<\/i>). Nejlep&scaron;&iacute; reakc&iacute; hr&aacute;&#269;e 1 na <i>b<\/i> je v&#382;dycky blafovat (tj. <i>(1,0)<\/i> neboli <em>a=1<\/em>), a v&scaron;echny strategie jsou nejlep&scaron;&iacute; reakc&iacute; p&#345;i <i>b=x\/(x+1)<\/i>.<\/p><p> Z&iacute;sk&aacute;me pr&aacute;v&#283; jedin&eacute; NEQ: <i>x\/(1+2x),1-x\/(1+2x),(x\/(x+1)),1-x\/(x+1))<\/i>.<\/p><h1>Praktick&eacute; implikace Nashova ekvilibria<\/h1><p>Pod&iacute;vejme se na situaci z pohledu hr&aacute;&#269;e 2. P&#345;edpokl&aacute;dejme, &#382;e <i>x = 1,<\/i> tj. hr&aacute;&#269; 1 vs&aacute;z&iacute; ve v&yacute;&scaron;i potu. Pak je NEQ <i>(0.5,0.5)<\/i>. Pokud hr&aacute;&#269; 2 dorovn&aacute;v&aacute; v 50% p&#345;&iacute;pad&#367; a zahazuje v 50% p&#345;&iacute;pad&#367;, potom strategie hr&aacute;&#269;e 2 je bezpe&#269;n&aacute;, tj. jeho protivn&iacute;k nem&#367;&#382;e ud&#283;lat &#382;&aacute;dn&eacute; rozhodnut&iacute;, kter&eacute; by zv&yacute;&scaron;ilo jeho <span style=\"background: red none repeat scroll 0% 50%\"><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">expected value.<\/span><\/span><\/p><p>  Ka&#382;d&aacute; ze strategi&iacute; je stejn&#283; dobrou reakc&iacute; na na&scaron;i strategii. Strategie <i>(0.5,0.5)<\/i> v&scaron;ak samoz&#345;ejm&#283; nen&iacute; nejlep&scaron;&iacute; reakc&iacute; na strategii hr&aacute;&#269;e 1. <span style=\"background: #ffffff none repeat scroll 0% 50%\">Ide&aacute;ln&#283; bychom v&#382;dy mohli naj&iacute;t nejlep&scaron;&iacute; reakci. Pokud je nap&#345;&iacute;klad soupe&#345; <\/span>rock, potom je velmi snadn&eacute; predikovat jeho strategii a zvolit nejlep&scaron;&iacute; reakci. Proti takov&eacute;mu hr&aacute;&#269;i bychom ani neuva&#382;ovali o tom, &#382;e budeme dorovn&aacute;vat v 50%.<\/p><p> V praxi ov&scaron;em dob&#345;&iacute; hr&aacute;&#269;i budou svoji strategii neust&aacute;le m&#283;nit a p&#345;izp&#367;sobovat ji va&scaron;emu stylu, zat&iacute;mco vy se budete naopak sna&#382;it p&#345;izp&#367;sobovat jejich adaptaci atd. Ide&aacute;ln&#283; budete v&#382;dy o krok nap&#345;ed p&#345;ed sv&yacute;m soupe&#345;em, tak&#382;e budete uva&#382;ovat na &uacute;rovni o jeden stupe&#328; vy&scaron;&scaron;&iacute; ne&#382; on. Potom budete moci odhadovat strategie sv&eacute;ho soupe&#345;e pom&#283;rn&#283; p&#345;esn&#283; a nap&#345;&iacute;klad odhadnout, zda protivn&iacute;k pr&aacute;v&#283; v tento moment ve h&#345;e pravd&#283;podobn&#283; blafuje (zde u&#382; pou&#382;&iacute;v&aacute;me slovo \"hra\" v tom v&yacute;znamu, jak jsme zvykl&iacute;). <\/p><p> Nane&scaron;t&#283;st&iacute; v&#382;dycky se budete st&#345;et&aacute;vat i s hr&aacute;&#269;i, kte&#345;&iacute; jsou lep&scaron;&iacute; ne&#382;li vy, tak&#382;e p&#345;em&yacute;&scaron;lej&iacute; na &uacute;rovni o jeden stupe&#328; vy&scaron;&scaron;&iacute;. Proti takov&yacute;m soupe&#345;&#367;m je nejlep&scaron;&iacute; pou&#382;&iacute;vat bezpe&#269;nou strategii. P&#345;i n&iacute; soupe&#345; nem&#367;&#382;e nijak vyu&#382;&iacute;t fakt, &#382;e je schopen v&aacute;s p&#345;e&#269;&iacute;st l&eacute;pe ne&#382; vy jeho. Kdybyste si se soupe&#345;em vym&#283;nili karty, potom byste vyhr&aacute;li p&#345;esn&#283; tolik, kolik by vyhr&aacute;l on proti v&aacute;m, nebo&#357; m&#367;&#382;ete op&#283;t zvolit strategii, kter&aacute; je v NEQ. <\/p><h1 style=\"background-color: #ffffff\"><font><font color=\"#000000\"><span style=\"background-image: none;background-repeat: repeat;background-attachment: scroll;background-position: 0% 50%\">Pozn&aacute;mky na z&aacute;v&#283;r<\/span><\/font><\/font><\/h1><p>a) Pokud jste se rozhodli prov&eacute;st ur&#269;itou akci nap&#345;&iacute;klad v 50% p&#345;&iacute;pad&#367;, potom by va&scaron;e rozhodnut&iacute;, zda ji zrovna v tento moment provedete, nebo ne, m&#283;lo b&yacute;t co nejv&iacute;ce n&aacute;hodn&eacute; a nem&#283;lo by se &#345;&iacute;dit &#382;&aacute;dn&yacute;m syst&eacute;mem, kter&yacute; je mo&#382;n&eacute; vysledovat. Je mnoho v&#283;c&iacute;, kter&eacute; m&#367;&#382;ete pou&#382;&iacute;t jako jednoduch&yacute; n&aacute;hodn&yacute; gener&aacute;tor, nap&#345;&iacute;klad vte&#345;inov&aacute; ru&#269;i&#269;ka na va&scaron;ich hodink&aacute;ch. Tak&eacute; m&#367;&#382;ete dorovnat na riveru jenom tehdy, kdy&#382; na n&#283;j p&#345;ijde karta se sudou hodnotou. I takov&yacute; n&aacute;hodn&yacute; gener&aacute;tor v&scaron;ak mohou n&#283;kdy soupe&#345;i p&#345;e&#269;&iacute;st, je-li p&#345;&iacute;li&scaron; z&#345;ejm&yacute; a oni jsou velmi v&scaron;&iacute;mav&iacute;.<\/p><p> <span lang=\"DE-AT\">b) Jak jsme u&#382; napsali ve druh&eacute; &#269;&aacute;sti, pokud <\/span>hr&aacute;&#269;<span lang=\"DE-AT\"> 1 pou&#382;&iacute;v&aacute; <\/span>strategii<span lang=\"DE-AT\"> <i>(a,1-a)<\/i>, znamen&aacute; to, &#382;e <\/span>hr&aacute;&#269;<span lang=\"DE-AT\"> 1 bude blafovat s pravd&#283;podobnost&iacute;<i> <\/i><\/span><span lang=\"DE-AT\"><i>a <\/i>obecn&#283;,<\/span><span lang=\"DE-AT\"> nikoli &#382;e <\/span>hr&aacute;&#269;<span lang=\"DE-AT\"> 1 bude blafovat s pravd&#283;podobnost&iacute; <i>a <\/i>tehdy<i>, pokud m&aacute; &scaron;patnou handu.<\/i> Proto v&aacute;m hodnota <i>a<\/i> nutn&#283; ne&#345;&iacute;k&aacute;, jak &#269;asto byste m&#283;li blafovat, jste-li <\/span>hr&aacute;&#269;<span lang=\"DE-AT\"> 1. Mus&iacute;te v&#283;d&#283;t, jak &#269;asto budete ve skute&#269;nosti m&iacute;t handu, kterou byste cht&#283;li blafem reprezentovat.<\/span><\/p><p> <span lang=\"DE-AT\"> P&#345;edstavte si t&#345;eba board JsTs4 2, kde m&#367;&#382;ete velmi pravd&#283;podobn&#283; m&iacute;t draw (straight &#269;i flush), a <\/span>hr&aacute;&#269;<span lang=\"DE-AT\"> 2 m&aacute; made handu. Pokud je river 6s, co&#382; kompletuje mo&#382;n&eacute; flush draws, a vy dr&#382;&iacute;te KQ, potom k tomu, abyste ur&#269;ili, jak &#269;asto m&aacute;te blafovat, byste m&#283;li zv&aacute;&#382;it, jak &#269;asto budete m&iacute;t flush. <\/span><\/p><p> <span lang=\"DE-AT\"> (As9s-As5s, As3s, As2s, 9s7s, 8s7s, 8s6s, 7s6s, 7s5s, 6s5s, 5s3s) je p&#345;&iacute;kladem realistick&eacute; range, kterou tvo&#345;&iacute; celkem 14 r&#367;zn&yacute;ch hand. Nedokon&#269;enou straight draw budete dr&#382;et p&#345;esn&#283; stejn&#283; &#269;asto (7 kombinac&iacute; KQ a 7 kombinac&iacute; 98, za p&#345;edpokladu, &#382;e OESD+FD byste u&#382; d&#345;&iacute;ve hr&aacute;li jinak).<\/span> <\/p><p> <span lang=\"DE-AT\"> Jestli&#382;e chcete nyn&iacute; blafovat s pravd&#283;podobnost&iacute; 1\/3, tj. blaf v jedn&eacute; t&#345;etin&#283; p&#345;&iacute;pad&#367;, potom <\/span><span lang=\"DE-AT\"> na blaf <\/span><span lang=\"DE-AT\">pot&#345;ebujete 7 r&#367;zn&yacute;ch hand <\/span><span lang=\"DE-AT\"><i>(7\/(14+7)=1\/3)<\/i>. Tak&#382;e kdy&#382; dr&#382;&iacute;te busted draw, m&#283;li byste blafovat v 50% p&#345;&iacute;pad&#367;:<\/span><span lang=\"DE-AT\"> <\/span><span lang=\"DE-AT\"><i>(7\/14 = 1\/2)<\/i>.<\/span><span lang=\"DE-AT\">&nbsp;<\/span><span lang=\"DE-AT\">&nbsp;<\/span><\/p><p> <span lang=\"DE-AT\"> Kdy&#382; v t&eacute;hle situaci m&#367;&#382;ete vylou&#269;it 98 (t&#345;eba s ohledem na akci p&#345;ed flopem), pak nem&aacute;te flush jen ve<\/span><span lang=\"DE-AT\"> 33% p&#345;&iacute;pad&#367;, co&#382; znamen&aacute;, &#382;e byste m&#283;li blafovat ve v&scaron;ech p&#345;&iacute;padech, kdy flush nem&aacute;te.<\/span><span lang=\"DE-AT\">&nbsp;<\/span><\/p><p> <span lang=\"DE-AT\"> c) Jste-li <\/span>v pozici hr&aacute;&#269;e <span lang=\"DE-AT\">2 a o&#269;ek&aacute;v&aacute;te, &#382;e <\/span>hr&aacute;&#269; <span lang=\"DE-AT\">1 bude blafovat s frekvenc&iacute;, kter&aacute; odpov&iacute;d&aacute; p&#345;ibli&#382;n&#283; NEQ, potom byste m&#283;li dorovnat v&#382;dy, kdy&#382; v ruce dr&#382;&iacute;te \"blockera\". Blocker je karta, kter&aacute; pat&#345;&iacute; do hand, je&#382; v&aacute;&scaron; soupe&#345; reprezentuje. Je tedy m&eacute;n&#283; pravd&#283;podobn&eacute;, &#382;e to, co se sna&#382;&iacute; reprezentovat, skute&#269;n&#283; m&aacute;.<\/span><\/p><p> <span lang=\"DE-AT\"> M&aacute;te-li kup&#345;&iacute;kladu AsJd v p&#345;&iacute;kladu v bodu b), potom 7 ze 14 hand na flush nem&#367;&#382;e soupe&#345; utvo&#345;it, a jsou tedy \"blokovan&eacute;\". Kdy&#382; protihr&aacute;&#269; pou&#382;ije metodu popsanou v b), potom spo&#269;&iacute;t&aacute; nespr&aacute;vnou blafovac&iacute; frekvenci pro svoje busted draws, proto&#382;e si bude myslet, &#382;e m&#367;&#382;e reprezentovat flush ve v&iacute;ce p&#345;&iacute;padech, ne&#382; jak tomu skute&#269;n&#283; je. Takto bude blafovat v 50% p&#345;&iacute;pad&#367; nam&iacute;sto 33%.<\/span><\/p><p> <span lang=\"DE-AT\"> Situace bude podobn&aacute;, jestli&#382;e river je 9 m&iacute;sto 6 a vy dr&#382;&iacute;te QQ. Jestli&#382;e soupe&#345; vsad&iacute; a chce reprezentovat KQ, potom polovinu kombinac&iacute; KQ m&#367;&#382;ete vylou&#269;it. <\/span><\/p><p class=\"MsoNormal\"><span lang=\"DE-AT\"><!--[if !supportEmptyParas]--> <!--[endif]--><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>V tomto \u010dl\u00e1nku si uk\u00e1\u017eeme n\u011bkter\u00e9 principy z teorie her a uk\u00e1\u017eeme si, jak je aplikovat v praxi.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"template":"","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":""},"strategy_category":[111],"strategy_level":[120],"class_list":["post-2873","strategy","type-strategy","status-publish","hentry","strategy_category-bss-vyuzivani-teorie-hry"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v28.2 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Nashovo ekvilibrium a blafovac\u00ed\/callovac\u00ed frekvence - Pokerstrategy Czech<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.pokerstrategy.com\/cs\/strategy\/bss\/nash-equilibrium-bluffing-calling-frekvence\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"cs_CZ\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Nashovo ekvilibrium a blafovac\u00ed\/callovac\u00ed frekvence - Pokerstrategy Czech\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"V tomto \u010dl\u00e1nku si uk\u00e1\u017eeme n\u011bkter\u00e9 principy z teorie her a uk\u00e1\u017eeme si, jak je aplikovat v praxi.\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.pokerstrategy.com\/cs\/strategy\/bss\/nash-equilibrium-bluffing-calling-frekvence\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Pokerstrategy Czech\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2026-06-11T10:59:43+00:00\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"15 minut\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.pokerstrategy.com\\\/cs\\\/strategy\\\/bss\\\/nash-equilibrium-bluffing-calling-frekvence\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.pokerstrategy.com\\\/cs\\\/strategy\\\/bss\\\/nash-equilibrium-bluffing-calling-frekvence\\\/\",\"name\":\"Nashovo ekvilibrium a blafovac\u00ed\\\/callovac\u00ed frekvence - Pokerstrategy Czech\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.pokerstrategy.com\\\/cs\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"2012-03-11T11:47:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2026-06-11T10:59:43+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.pokerstrategy.com\\\/cs\\\/strategy\\\/bss\\\/nash-equilibrium-bluffing-calling-frekvence\\\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"cs\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.pokerstrategy.com\\\/cs\\\/strategy\\\/bss\\\/nash-equilibrium-bluffing-calling-frekvence\\\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.pokerstrategy.com\\\/cs\\\/strategy\\\/bss\\\/nash-equilibrium-bluffing-calling-frekvence\\\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.pokerstrategy.com\\\/cs\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Strategies\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.pokerstrategy.com\\\/cs\\\/strategy\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":3,\"name\":\"Nashovo ekvilibrium a blafovac\u00ed\\\/callovac\u00ed frekvence\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.pokerstrategy.com\\\/cs\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.pokerstrategy.com\\\/cs\\\/\",\"name\":\"Pokerstrategy Czech\",\"description\":\"\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.pokerstrategy.com\\\/cs\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"cs\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Nashovo ekvilibrium a blafovac\u00ed\/callovac\u00ed frekvence - Pokerstrategy Czech","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.pokerstrategy.com\/cs\/strategy\/bss\/nash-equilibrium-bluffing-calling-frekvence\/","og_locale":"cs_CZ","og_type":"article","og_title":"Nashovo ekvilibrium a blafovac\u00ed\/callovac\u00ed frekvence - Pokerstrategy Czech","og_description":"V tomto \u010dl\u00e1nku si uk\u00e1\u017eeme n\u011bkter\u00e9 principy z teorie her a uk\u00e1\u017eeme si, jak je aplikovat v praxi.","og_url":"https:\/\/www.pokerstrategy.com\/cs\/strategy\/bss\/nash-equilibrium-bluffing-calling-frekvence\/","og_site_name":"Pokerstrategy Czech","article_modified_time":"2026-06-11T10:59:43+00:00","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_misc":{"Est. reading time":"15 minut"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.pokerstrategy.com\/cs\/strategy\/bss\/nash-equilibrium-bluffing-calling-frekvence\/","url":"https:\/\/www.pokerstrategy.com\/cs\/strategy\/bss\/nash-equilibrium-bluffing-calling-frekvence\/","name":"Nashovo ekvilibrium a blafovac\u00ed\/callovac\u00ed frekvence - Pokerstrategy Czech","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.pokerstrategy.com\/cs\/#website"},"datePublished":"2012-03-11T11:47:00+00:00","dateModified":"2026-06-11T10:59:43+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.pokerstrategy.com\/cs\/strategy\/bss\/nash-equilibrium-bluffing-calling-frekvence\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"cs","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.pokerstrategy.com\/cs\/strategy\/bss\/nash-equilibrium-bluffing-calling-frekvence\/"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.pokerstrategy.com\/cs\/strategy\/bss\/nash-equilibrium-bluffing-calling-frekvence\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.pokerstrategy.com\/cs\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Strategies","item":"https:\/\/www.pokerstrategy.com\/cs\/strategy\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":3,"name":"Nashovo ekvilibrium a blafovac\u00ed\/callovac\u00ed frekvence"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.pokerstrategy.com\/cs\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.pokerstrategy.com\/cs\/","name":"Pokerstrategy Czech","description":"","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.pokerstrategy.com\/cs\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"cs"}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.pokerstrategy.com\/cs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/strategy\/2873","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.pokerstrategy.com\/cs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/strategy"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.pokerstrategy.com\/cs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/strategy"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.pokerstrategy.com\/cs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.pokerstrategy.com\/cs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2873"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"strategy_category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.pokerstrategy.com\/cs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/strategy_category?post=2873"},{"taxonomy":"strategy_level","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.pokerstrategy.com\/cs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/strategy_level?post=2873"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}