A system of rake with ideal qualities

    • JohnSmith5555
      JohnSmith5555
      Basic
      Joined: 02.02.2015 Posts: 30
      It would be ideal if sites offered rakeback points on a (decentralized) digital asset exchange. Because such a "free market" would allow the player/participants to valuate their exchange of money for chips on each site, thus solving pokers value measurement problem (ie What is the effective rake?).

      But it seems very likely that, although that scheme for arranging for a system of rake with ideal qualities would work well, that, on the other hand, it would be politically difficult to arrive at the implementation of such a system[

      In the near future there may be a smaller number of major sites used in the world and these may stand in competitive relations among themselves. There is now the “euro" sites and the old history of the UB scandal is past history now. And there COULD be introduced, for example, a similar international site for the Islamic world or for South Asia, or for South America, or here or there.

      So here is the possibility of “asymptotically ideal (rakeless) poker". Starting with the idea of value stabilization in relation to a domestic ‘deposits raked’ index associated with the territory of one state, beyond that there is the natural and logical concept of internationally based rake comparisons. The sites being compared, like PSFTCIAFBIDOJ, Merge, Party Poker, etc. can be viewed with critical eyes by their players and by those who may have the option of whether or not or how to use one of them. This can lead to pressure for good quality and consequently for a lessened rate of rake.
      Full lecture: https://www.scribd.com/doc/224948379/Ideal-Poker
  • 4 replies
    • tonypmm
      tonypmm
      Silver
      Joined: 11.01.2009 Posts: 3,853
      Poker sites have an upper hand in deciding how much rake to charge, and they police it in a way that maximises their own longterm profit. As long as there are enough players (often irrational / gamblers) willing to pay the current rake, it will be taken. So I don't really see a point for an 'equilibrium discussion': players as a negotiation party are self-organised so much worse than operators that the latter will have a decisive edge in the rake negotiation for very long, perhaps during our entire lives.
    • JohnSmith5555
      JohnSmith5555
      Basic
      Joined: 02.02.2015 Posts: 30
      Originally posted by tonypmm
      As long as there are enough players (often irrational / gamblers) willing to pay the current rake, it will be taken.

      So I don't really see a point for an 'equilibrium discussion'...
      this is the logic i don't understand.
    • tonypmm
      tonypmm
      Silver
      Joined: 11.01.2009 Posts: 3,853
      Speaking in terms of transfer of utility (I've had similar ideas as well), gamblers (risk-seeking, recreational players) are fine with losing money in the long run in return for getting 'adrenaline' / variance. They could lose it to a casino instead, but some of them prefer to face fellow human players, which makes gambling more interesting to them.

      Winning regulars (who're moderately risk-averse) are only interested in playing poker when they can beat the game after rakeback, at a comfortable margin that offsets the variance effects.

      Recreational players are OK with losing more $ on average than winning players need to get in order to play. The difference is taken by poker sites as rake, which exceeds their operation costs by far (look at their billions of revenue), in return for providing the software and bringing recs together with the regs. We get a three-way deal that is lucrative to all the three parties (recs, regs, sites) in terms of expected utility.

      If winning players disappear because of high rake, recreationals won't disappear, there will be just fewer games running, but poker sites will be still in big profit.

      The reason why sites want to sustain a pool of winning (but preferably breakevenish) regulars is that 1) they want to give an impression that everyone can win a lot in poker, 2) regulars help convert recreationals' deposits into rake more effectively.

      Poker rake will never tend to zero because there will always be players who'll be OK with paying a few % to get their gambling fix, just like there are those who are OK with forfeiting several-% house edges in slot games while not even having a chance to win in the infinitely long run.
    • JohnSmith5555
      JohnSmith5555
      Basic
      Joined: 02.02.2015 Posts: 30
      Much of what you say I specifically agree with, except mostly about the inference that what has happened historically will continue into the future. You seem to have stronger knowledge than others on this subject though. Perhaps we might ignite special dialogue on the subject.

      For example, I don't believe we are doomed to this self-perpetuating prophecy, but rather it is a symptom of "pokers value measurement problem". Or simply put if players could accurately assess their own winrates (especially with respect to "rake" or rather "effective rake"), they would be far more inclined to choose their "seat" or "site" wisely.

      This might not seem so relevant since it would be difficult to solve and even harder to implement, but I think from this we can at least extrapolate a theoretical solution. My understand is theoretical ideals, can sometimes lead to tangible implementable solution.

      Here for example I offer the idea of players being able to trade rakeback points on an exchange, in order that they might properly valuate their exchange of money for chips. Then if we understand the significance of the "value measurement" problem poker faces, and we can understand this "theoretical" solution, we may be able to work with the philosophy, in order to produce something that might be of value to the poker economy.

      Again it might seem like a strange approach, but I am pretty confident there is at least a theoretical/philosophical solution that is quite direct/succinct.