If it showed nothing new, I don't think I'd have posted it.
Originally posted by DukeFreedom
Then you'll see that EV[b/f] > EV[c/c] > EV[c/f] then.
As for your second question about the 1/(bets in pot)...
Lemme first just quote what Cornholio wrote
If you assume your opponent will check behind all worse hands in case you check, but bet for value all better hands, it would be sufficient if the opponent called a worse hand with a probability of 1/(bets in the pot). If the opponent has a better hand, you would lose one bet, and you won't get a bet from a worse hand.
He worded this very poorly and actually it's even wrong when this is what he really ment, because as I said before: if our equity <50% and we assume your opponent always checks behind worse hands when checked to then c/f is always the best move.
Instead, he should have written
If you assume your opponent will play optimally in case you check, it would be sufficient if the opponent called a worse hand with a probability of 1/(bets in the pot).
Now note that playing optimally is *NOT* the same as always checking behind worse hands. To see this quickly, take your example and assume that your opponent will bluff 1/11 times when he bets (when you check to him). In that case you can't call (actually: you'll be indifferent between calling or folding), because 10/11 times you'll loose 1 BB and 1/11 times you'll win the pot of 10 BB, giving a net EV of 0, the same as c/f.
In fact, "playing optimally" is very precisely defined for your opponent according to game theory, but I really don't want to get into explaining the exact theory behind this... Basically it just says that your opponent will bluff with such a frequency that you'll be indifferent between c/c his bet or c/f.
Hence this "optimal playing strategy" for your opponent dictates that both c/c and c/f will have an EV of 0 for you, as with the example I gave above.
However, b/f will have an EV of > 0 if your opponent calls worse hands with a probability P > 1/B, where B = bets in pot. This follows, because:
with probability (1-P) we lose 1
with probability P we win B+1
Now the net EV of b/f will be P*(B+1) - (1-P)*1= P*B - 1.
Now P*B - 1 will always be > 0 if P > 1/B.
Hence b/f will be better then c/c and c/f if we assume our opponent calls worse hands with probability > 1/(bets in pot) and would play optimally if we check.